Disgust and shame were linked more strongly in CS than in other RMs, and anger and guilt were more strongly linked than other emotion pairs in EM. Moral emotions in RMs involving hierarchy (AR and MP) differed widely depending on the perpetrator’s dominant or subordinate status. Metabolism inhibitor Both Turkish (TR) and English-speaking (EN) samples showed similar patterns of all moral emotions across RMs. Understanding the functions of moral emotions in relationships using relational models can help to clarify multiple aspects of moral psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).Social connection may stem from afferent pathways that bring bodily information to the brain and mind. In support of this perspective, research from animals and humans shows that physical warmth causally affects experiences of social connection. However, whether physical warmth affects feelings of social connection and the brain’s response to close others remains unknown. In the current study, 42 participants completed an fMRI scan as they viewed images of a close other and strangers while holding warm, cold, and room-temperature objects. Following the scan, participants reported on their feelings of social connection and pleasure in response to the three temperature conditions. Results revealed a specific effect of physical warmth on brain activity to close others as compared with cooler temperatures (both cold and room temperature) and strangers (e.g., in the ventral striatum, middle-insula, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, pregenual cingulate cortex). Cooler temperatures had no effect on brain activity to close others (vs. strangers). Further, physical warmth increased feelings of social connection, even when adjusting for feelings of pleasure, but not vice versa, suggesting physical warmth may have specific effects on feelings of social connection. Results add to an emerging literature on the contribution of physical warmth to social connection and furthers understanding of why and how connecting with others is a basic need for humans. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).To what extent do our genes make us nice, smart, or athletic? The explanatory frameworks we employ have broad consequences for how we evaluate and interact with others. Yet to date, little is known regarding when and how young children appeal to genetic explanations to understand human difference. The current study examined children’s (aged 7-13 years) and adults’ explanations for a set of human characteristics, contrasting genetic attributions with environmental and choice-based attributions. Whereas most adults and older children offered an unprompted genetic explanation at least once on an open-ended task, such explanations were not seen from younger children. However, even younger children, once trained on the mechanism of genes, endorsed genetic explanations for a range of characteristics-often in combination with environment and choice. Moreover, only adults favored genetic explanations for intelligence and athleticism; children, in contrast, favored environment and choice explanations for these characteristics. These findings suggest that children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but also that such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults. Our study provides some of the first evidence regarding the ways in which genetic attributions emerge and change starting in early childhood. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).Reward magnitude is a central concept in most theories of preferential decision making and learning. However, it is unknown whether variable rewards also influence cognitive processes when learning how to make accurate decisions (e.g., sorting healthy and unhealthy food differing in appeal). To test this, we conducted 3 studies. Participants learned to classify objects with 3 feature dimensions into two categories before solving a transfer task with novel objects. During learning, we rewarded all correct decisions, but specific category exemplars yielded a 10 times higher reward (high vs. low). Counterintuitively, categorization performance did not increase for high-reward stimuli, compared with an equal-reward baseline condition. Instead, performance decreased reliably for low-reward stimuli. To analyze the influence of reward magnitude on category generalization, we implemented an exemplar-categorization model and a cue-weighting model using a Bayesian modeling approach. We tested whether reward magnitude affects (a) the availability of exemplars in memory, (b) their psychological similarity to the stimulus, or (c) attention to stimulus features. In all studies, the evidence favored the hypothesis that reward magnitude affects the similarity gradients of high-reward exemplars compared with the equal-reward baseline. The results from additional reward-judgment tasks (Studies 2 and 3) strongly suggest that the cognitive processes of reward-value generalization parallel those of category generalization. Overall, the studies provide insights highlighting the need for integrating reward- and category-learning theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).Interference tasks combining different distractor types usually find that between-trial adaptations (congruency sequence effects [CSEs]) do not interact with each other, suggesting that sensorimotor control is domain-specific. However, within each trial, different distractor types often do interact, suggesting that control is domain-general. The present study presents a solution to this apparent paradox. In 3 experiments, testing 130 participants in total, we (a) confirm the simultaneous presence of between-trial domain-specific (noninteracting) CSEs and within-trial “domain-general” interactions in a fully factorial hybrid prime-Simon design free of repetition or contingency confounds; (b) demonstrate that the within-trial interaction occurs with supraliminal, but not with subliminal primes; and (c) show that it is disproportionately enlarged in older adults. Our findings suggest that whereas interference (priming and Simon) effects and CSEs reflect direct sensorimotor control, the within-trial interaction does not reflect sensorimotor control but “confusion” at higher-level processing stages (reactivation aversion effect [RAE]).